Many years ago, when I was starting my journey into electric mobility, NIU was already special. That was the time when the rest of China was NOT known for making quality products. NIU was the first high-tech, high-quality brand from the country. To emphasize and communicate the quality aspects, the first-generation NIUs carried BOSCH motors and controllers and Panasonic cells, something that the brand communicated convincingly. This allowed the brand to position itself at the premium end of the market.
Over the years, NIU has cemented this premium position even as much larger rivals like Yadea went for high-volume, mass appeal. However, newer entrants like Segway-Ninebot now challenge NIU’s tech supremacy. Tech is also more accessible with mainstream brands like Yadea, AIMA, and SUNRA, offering the same basic functionality as NIU.
Arguably, this makes life difficult for a premium brand that still needs to pack in premium features but cannot charge the premium for the premiumness. A brand like Niu in China/Europe and Ather in India needs to innovate with every product, in every quarter, to stay ahead of the pack. Yet, the pack seems to be closing in continuously.
The pack also has lower prices, and you have to bend to compete. This hasn’t happened with Ather in India yet, but it does seem to be happening with Niu now. In the quarter gone by (Q3 2026), NIU sold 537,457 vehicles, making it its seasonally strongest quarter. However, it still lost RMB 34 million (USD 5.1 million). Even with a 15% bump in sales, the revenue barely moved. Niu missed its own guidance by a wide margin, and the premium e-bicycle business that built the brand has roughly halved in China. The margin-for-volume trade-off NIU began in 2024 is no longer paying for itself.

The headline numbers
NIU reported third-quarter 2026 revenue of RMB 1,713.6 million (USD 257 million), up just 1.2% year on year, on sales volume that grew 15.4% to 537,457 units. The China volume improved by 8.6% to 490,406 units, and international volume more than tripled to 47,051 units. Gross margin fell to 18.0% from 21.8% a year earlier. The company swung from a net profit of RMB 81.7 million (USD 12.25 million) in Q3 2025 to a net loss of RMB 34.0 million (USD 5.1 million), and its adjusted net loss, which excludes only share-based compensation, was RMB 27.8 million (USD 4.1 million).

The quarter also missed NIU’s own guidance. In August, management guided Q3 revenue to RMB 1.86 billion to RMB 2.03 billion, or a 10% to 20% growth. The actual figure came in at about RMB 146 million, or 7.9%, below the bottom of that range. Revenue growth has now decelerated from 33% in Q1 to 15% in Q2 to 1.2% in Q3.
The culprit here is the blended revenue per scooter. From RMB 3636 in Q3 2025, it has come down to RMB 3188, a 12.3% decline.
I have tracked this pattern for a while. In May 2025, I wrote that sacrificing margins for volumes was working for now. In August this year, I noted that NIU’s Q2 met revenue guidance but failed on margins. Q3 is the first quarter in which NIU has missed on both.
Previous coverage of NIU financials: (Post continues below)
Niu Sacrifices Margins for Volumes
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Niu Q1 Sales Jump on China Volumes
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Niu Q1: Sacrificing Margins for Volumes is Working for Now
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Niu Q2 Numbers: China Delivers; International Falters
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Niu’s Q3 2025 Numbers See a Huge Jump
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Niu’s Q3 2025: How to do Electric Mobility Right
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Niu has a Bad Q4 in a Good Year
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Niu Q1 Scooter Sales Rise Even as Global Operations Disappoint
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Niu’s Q2: China does the lifting, International Yet to recover
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Niu’s Q2 Meets Revenue But Fails on Margins
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The per-vehicle arithmetic worries me
I tried to rebuild the unit economics using NIU’s disclosures.
| Per vehicle (RMB) | Q3 2025 | Q1 2026 | Q2 2026 | Q3 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue, including accessories and services | 3,636 | 3,476 | 3,314 | 3,188 |
| Cost of revenues | 2,842 | 2870 | 2,784 | 2,613 |
| Gross profit | 794 | 606 | 530 | 575 |
| Selling and marketing | 461 | 686 | 549 | 448 |
| Total operating expenses | 638 | 1007 | 784 | 653 |
Source: NIU quarterly results; per-vehicle figures are calculations from reported totals and volumes.
The revenue (blended) per scooter has declined by 12.3% from RMB 3,636 to RMB 3,188. However, the gross margin per scooter had a steeper fall, declining from RMB 794 to RMB 575, a 27.6% decline. Meanwhile, selling and marketing expenses are almost flat at about RMB 450. Total operating expenses have gone up slightly from RMB 638 per scooter to RMB 653.
There is one genuine improvement here. In Q2, I pointed out that NIU was spending more to sell and market each scooter than the scooter earned at the gross level. In Q3, that reversed as gross profit per vehicle recovered to RMB 575, while selling and marketing expenses per vehicle fell to RMB 448 as seasonal volume spread the fixed costs more thinly.
The slide in realization has been relentless. Revenue per vehicle peaked at RMB 3,914 in Q4 2025 and has fallen to RMB 3,188 in the three quarters, a decline of 18.5%. Accessories, spare parts and services, which should be the margin cushion for a connected-scooter brand, also reversed, falling 9.6% to RMB 131.1 million. At a per-vehicle level, it fell 21.5% to RMB 244, reversing the 29% growth it posted in Q2.
China: the motorcycle pivot and the e-bicycle hole
China still generates almost 90% of NIU’s vehicle revenue, and China revenue fell 4.0% to RMB 1,423.3 million despite the higher sales volume. China revenue per vehicle fell 11.6% to RMB 2,902, down from RMB 3,120 in Q1 and RMB 3,010 in Q2.
Part of the slowdown is the base. A year ago, NIU’s Q3 2025 numbers saw a huge jump, with China volume up 74% to more than 451,000 units as the market recovered from the 2024 regulatory disruption. Growing on that base was always going to be harder.
The bigger issue is what NIU is selling to grow.
According to summaries of the earnings call, electric motorcycles/seated scooters grew about 350 percent year on year and now account for 56% of NIU’s China volume. That is roughly 275,000 units this quarter, versus about 61,000 a year ago. Strip those out, and NIU’s remaining China volume falls to about 216,000 units from roughly 390,000, a decline of around 45%. That estimate matches management’s own figure for e-bicycles, which it says fell 45%, with Tier 1 city sales down about 30%. Management attributed a 5.6-point fall in China gross margin to upstream cost inflation and the shift toward lower-margin motorcycles.
This matters because the premium e-bicycle is what made NIU different. NIU’s contribution was proving that a Chinese brand could win on quality, technology, and design rather than price, and it pushed the incumbents to follow. The new national e-bicycle standard, which arrived alongside the end of trade-in subsidies for e-bikes, has hit that premium segment the hardest. NIU has backfilled the lost volume with motorcycles that carry lower margins. In the Chinese market, there is a big overlap between e-bicycles and e-motorcycles in pricing, except that e-bicycles enjoy much better margins.
The premium segment recovery that management once expected in Q2 has now slipped into 2027. The plan rests on AI features, including the NIU AIOS interface. It looks interesting and has already won a Red Dot award. But anyone who believes in Red Dot awards likely also believes in Santa Claus.
Also introduced this quarter was a mid-tier e-bicycle priced at RMB 3,299. That’s a step down the pricing ladder, considering Niu used to sit above RMB 4,000.
NIU is not alone in this. Yadea also reported lower first-half revenue and profit (I did not write about Yadea’s first half), citing the same transition to the new standard. The difference is that Yadea has the scale to absorb a price war, and NIU does not.
International: a recovery from a very low base
The International e-scooter revenue rose 137.6% to RMB 159.2 million on volume growth of 226.3%. That looks great but comes off a small base. In Q3 2025, NIU’s international volume had collapsed 73% to just 14,418 units. Two years ago, in Q3 2024, NIU shipped roughly 53,000 units to international markets. So, Q3 2026’s sales, even after the 226% growth, remain lower than Q3 2024.
The quality of the growth is also questionable. Revenue per international unit fell 27.2% to RMB 3,384. That reflects a mix shift toward lower-priced micromobility products, likely helped by Best Buy distribution in more than 700 US stores, as well as inventory clearance that management admitted was partly sold at a negative gross margin. European stock is not yet fully cleared. Management says US micromobility inventory has now normalized, expects a positive US gross margin in Q4, and is targeting international profitability in 2027. European dealers rose to 464 from 417 in Q2. International is still only about 9% of revenue, though, so it cannot offset the margin problem in China.
Operating expenses: leverage, not discipline
Total operating expenses rose 18.1% to RMB 350.9 million, or 20.5% of revenue, up from 17.5% a year ago. Selling and marketing rose 12.1% to RMB 240.9 million, research and development jumped 48.2% to RMB 64.3 million, and general and administrative expenses rose 17.8% to RMB 45.7 million, with RMB 8.7 million of that increase coming from foreign-exchange losses. The opex ratio has improved from 29% in Q1 to 23.6% in Q2, but absolute spending was higher in Q3 than in Q2. The ratio improved because seasonal revenue was larger, and it will rise again when revenue falls in Q4.
The balance sheet: whose cash is it?
NIU ended September with RMB 1,727.1 million in cash, term deposits and short-term investments, plus RMB 215.5 million of restricted cash, against RMB 220.0 million of short-term bank borrowings. Cash and cash equivalents rose by RMB 467.7 million during the year.
That cash did not come from profits. Over the same nine months, accounts payable rose by RMB 500.0 million to RMB 1,204.1 million, while shareholders’ equity fell by RMB 214.5 million to RMB 690.4 million on a nine-month net loss of RMB 230.2 million. The cash build is suppliers’ money.
Q4 guidance and the full-year target
NIU guided Q4 revenue to RMB 947 million (USD 142 million) to RMB 1,082 million, or 40% to 60% growth. That sounds strong, but overcoming Q4 2025 numbers should be easy. Q4 2025 was extraordinarily weak, when revenue fell 17.4% to RMB 676.2 million (USD 101 million), and the company lost RMB 88.1 million (USD 13.2 million). At the midpoint, the guidance implies a decline of about 41% from Q3. Management partly blames an industry-wide pause in 3C certificate renewals that halted e-bicycle production in November, and it expects delayed shipments to return in a Q1 2027 restocking wave.
The guidance implies full-year 2026 revenue of about RMB 5.0 billion to RMB 5.15 billion, or growth of roughly 16% to 19%. NIU has sold about 1.23 million units so far this year. At revenue per vehicle near RMB 2,950, the Q4 midpoint translates to roughly 340,000 to 350,000 units, putting the year at about 1.57 million. That is much below the bottom of the 1.67 million to 1.91 million unit target NIU set at the start of the year.